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Abstract: There is a kind of objectivism in epistemology that involves the acceptance 
of objective epistemic norms. It is generally regarded as harmless. There is another 
kind of objectivism in epistemology that involves the acceptance of an objectivist 
account of justification, one that takes the justification of a belief to turn on its 
accuracy. It is generally regarded as hopeless. It is a strange and unfortunate 
sociological fact that these attitudes are so prevalent. Objectivism about norms and 
justification stand or fall together. Justification is simply a matter of conforming to 
norms.  In this essay, I shall make the case for objectivism about justification. 
 
1. Introduction 
I will defend two objectivist views. The first is a view about epistemic norms. 
Objectivists about norms believe that some norms have objective application 
conditions (i.e., conditions that don't supervene upon our non-factive mental states or 
the subjective aspects of our mental lives).  The second is a view about epistemic 
justification. Objectivists about justification believe that justification depends upon 
whether certain objective conditions obtain. If, say, some objective condition is met 
and there's a norm that says that you shouldn't believe that it's raining if this condition 
is met, you couldn't justifiably believe that it's raining because this condition is met. It 
might not seem that the condition is met. You might have evidence that leads you to 
think that you violate no norms, but your belief still wouldn't be justified because you 
violated this norm.   
 Norms identify the conditions under which someone should or should not 
believe, do, or feel something. Objectivists and subjectivists agree that some norms 
have subjective application conditions (e.g., if there's a norm that requires probabilistic 
coherence there is a norm with a subjective application condition). Their disagreement 
is about whether there are any further norms that require us to believe or refrain from 
believing when objective conditions obtain.  Their disagreement is about norms like 
these:  
You shouldn't believe p unless you know p (Only 
Knowledge).1 
You shouldn't believe p unless p is true (Only Truth).2  
Objectivists will have their disagreements about these norms (e.g., some would argue 
that Only Truth needs to be supplemented by further norms and some would argue 
that Only Knowledge delivers the wrong verdict in Gettier cases), but they wouldn't 
think that these aren't genuine norms just because we refer to something objective in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 For defenses of knowledge norms for assertion, belief, or reasoning, see Benton (2011), 
Bird (2007), Littlejohn (2013), Smithies (2013), Steglich-Petersen (2013), Sutton (2007), 
Turri (2011), and Williamson (2000). 
2 If Only Knowledge governs belief, so does Only Truth.  For defenses of Only Truth 
that aren't intended to support Only Knowledge, see Boghossian (2008), Nolfi (2015), 
Wedgwood (2002, 2013), and Whiting (2013).  For criticism, see Brown (2008), Gerken 
(2011) and McKinnon (2013). For a helpful overview of the extant debate, see McGlynn 
(2014).   
specifying their application conditions. Subjectivists, on the other hand, insist that all 
genuine norms have subjective application conditions, conditions we specify by 
reference to subjective aspects of your mental life. Normative evaluation, they'll say, 
should always be concerned with relations between a subject's attitudes or actions and 
further features of our subjective mental lives. 
 An action or attitude is justified when it is proper, acceptable, permitted, right, 
or appropriate. If you have an attitude or perform an action and it's not the case that 
you shouldn't, the attitude or action counts as justified. Norms identify the conditions 
under which you should or should not have an attitude or perform an action, so we can 
characterize justification in terms of norm conformity and violation. A belief is 
justified iff it violates no epistemic norms, which is to say that it is justified iff the 
thinker conforms to the epistemic norms. If we think of justification in this way, 
objectivism about norms and justification should stand or fall together.3 
 In what follows, I'll offer arguments for Only Truth and Only Knowledge. I'll 
also argue that our beliefs are justified only when they constitute knowledge. In the 
paper's final section, I'll consider a recent subjectivist response to these kinds of 
arguments.  I don't have space to address most of the extant objections to the 
objectivist views defended here and don't have the space to say everything that should 
be said in support of the arguments for objectivism. My hope is that the reader will 
agree that these arguments are interesting, potentially important, and worth further 
discussion. 
 
2.  Objective or Subjective? 
Let's start with a simple argument for objectivism about justification:  
An Argument for Objectivism 
O1. Your beliefs are justified iff you violate no epistemic 
norms in holding these beliefs. 
O2. You violate no epistemic norms in holding these 
beliefs iff these beliefs constitute knowledge. 4 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 While Littlejohn (2012), Sutton (2007), and Williamson (forthcoming) all defend views 
on which beliefs are justified only when they don't violate objective norms, most of the 
writers mentioned above won't defend objectivism about justification by appeal to 
some objectivist view about norms. 
4 There is an interesting question about (O2) that we don't have space to discuss in 
detail. Is it possible to know p and violate some epistemic norm that requires you not to 
believe p? While it's an interesting question whether there could be cases in which 
someone shouldn't believe what they know, answering this question won't help us 
settle the debates between the objectivists and subjectivists.  There are some 
epistemologists who think that it's just obvious that anything you know you justifiably 
believe because they think that justification is a part of knowledge (whatever that 
means). This is not my picture of justification. On my account of justification, the 
justification property is a property that a belief has iff it violates no epistemic norm (or, 
more carefully, does not do so without sufficient reason). Because justification is not 
part of the nature of knowledge, it isn't trivially true that anything known is thereby 
justifiably believed and thereby believed without violating any epistemic norms. On 
my view, knowledge is a relation between a thinker and a fact, a relation that holds 
between some thinkers and some facts where the thinker's beliefs could not have the 
OC. Your beliefs are justified iff they constitute 
knowledge. 
If the argument is sound, readers should take the 'factive turn'.   
 If (OC) is correct, it is possible for pairs of thinkers to process things in just the 
same way, draw the very same conclusions using the same reasoning after things 
appear precisely the same to them, and still form beliefs that differ in justificatory 
status. This suggests that a kind of rational perfection might fall short of ensuring that 
our beliefs are justified. If you like to talk about luck, you could say that the objectivist 
view of justification that identifies justified belief with knowledge allows for a certain 
kind of luck that many epistemologists won't allow for and doesn't allow for a certain 
kind of luck that many epistemologists would allow for.  Many epistemologists are 
opposed to the idea that a thinker might fail to acquire justified beliefs because they 
suffer the kind of bad luck that would prevent a rational thinker who reasons 
impeccably from acquiring knowledge.  One reason that I'm opposed to subjectivism is 
precisely because it implies this kind of luck isn't possible.  This knowledge account of 
justification implies that a certain kind of luck that many epistemologists take to have 
no bearing on justification can rob you of justification. The lucky connection between 
a thinker and a fact that robs you of knowledge is one that robs you of justification.  In 
the course of our discussion, I shall explain why I think it's important for our view of 
norms and justification to register that the kind of accidental connections between 
thinker and present in Gettier cases prevents you from acquiring beliefs that have good 
standing.  
 Subjectivists will probably say I've just made three significant errors. 
Justification (and, possibly, norm conformity) doesn't require truth. It also doesn't 
require a non-accidental connection to truth. Justification also wouldn't require more 
than rationality because normative assessment is concerned only with the kind of 
processing that takes us from appearance to belief. To support their case, the 
subjectivists might offer this argument:  
An Argument for Subjectivism 
S1. If p and q seem the same in all epistemically relevant 
respects to a perfectly rational person, she would accord 
the same credence to p and q.5  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
justification property because these thinkers cannot be held accountable for their 
attitudes or actions. Our beloved dogs and cats presumably know things about their 
environments, but I don't think we'd want to say that their beliefs could be justified or 
unjustified. I think that only thinkers that can be held accountable can have justified or 
unjustified beliefs. On my picture, the relationship between justification and 
knowledge is analogous to the utilitarian attitude towards the relationship between 
right action and optimific actions. A dog's actions might be optimific without being 
right, but the actions of responsible agents could not be anything but right if optimific.  
5 In the context of the paper, it is clear that Huemer intends the antecedent to be read 
as saying that p and q seem the same in all epistemically relevant respects to the 
particular thinker whose attitudes we're assessing.  He is not interested in whether p and 
q seem the same in such respects to an external observer who knows, say, that p is true 
and q is false. It should be noted that (S1) is not just a restatement of the idea that 
justification supervenes upon appearances. It is also not a trivial consequence of that 
supervenience thesis.  Someone could reject (S1) and still defend that supervenience 
S2. If a perfectly rational person would accord the same 
credence to p and q, then p and q have the same degree of 
justification.  
S3. The propositions p and q seem the same to our thinker 
in all epistemically relevant respects. 
SC. Therefore, p and q have the same degree of 
justification for our thinker.6 
We should read (SC) as implying that the thinker is in a position to justifiably believe p 
iff she is in a position to justifiably believe q.  Because it's possible for the thinker's 
beliefs in p and q to differ in truth-value when p and q seem to them the same in all 
relevant respects, this argument threatens (O2) and possibly (O1). 
 In choosing my arguments for (O1) and (O2), I chose arguments that show why 
it's important to resist arguments like this argument for subjectivism.  It's clear that 
Huemer thinks that facts about how things seem or appear have a great deal of 
normative significance, but this argument doesn't tell us why we should agree with 
him. Some would ask us to consider error cases to try to elicit intuitions about 
rationality to shore up support for the key premises.7 Some would suggest that 
appearances determine what evidence we have and look to defend this argument by 
appeal to some norms that tell us that justification is entirely a matter of how our 
beliefs fit our evidence.8  The arguments I've chosen should help readers see why I 
don't think that these ancillary arguments will do much to advance the subjectivist 
cause. 
 Does this subjectivist argument need support from further arguments? I think 
so. The argument runs from some suggestions about rational credence to a conclusion 
about the justification of full belief. Is there any good reason to think that the 
justificatory status of full belief in p and q would be the same if the subject rationally 
invested the same credence in these propositions? Lottery cases suggest that there isn't.  
When it comes to believing lottery propositions and believing what you read in the 
paper, it seems you should have higher credence in lottery propositions but could only 
be justified in believing fully what you read in the paper. 
 Of course, it could be said that this is just a distraction since the objectivist and 
subjectivist can agree that you shouldn't believe lottery propositions and reject (S2). I 
agree. Once we strip away the questionable assumptions about the relationship 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
thesis.  Suppose there's some rational requirement that says, in effect, that Agnes 
should suspend on p and not suspend on q when things appear a certain way to her. 
Things could appear the relevant way to Agnes, Agnes could be required to suspend 
on whether p but permitted to believe q, but it also might seem to Agnes that p and q 
are the same in all epistemically relevant respects. (Someone could say that this means 
that Agnes is somehow less than fully rational, but I don't see that. Provided that Agnes 
doesn't violate these rational requirements, I don't see her as rationally simply because 
she doesn't appreciate the rational difference between the propositions that she 
entertains but doesn't believe.) For criticism of (S1) and its use in Huemer's argument 
for phenomental conservatism, see Littlejohn (2011).       
6 Huemer (forthcoming).  
7 See Cohen (1984) and Wedgwood (2002). 
8 See Dougherty (2011) for a discussion of combining Conee and Feldman's (2004) 
evidentialist view with phenomenal conservatism.  
between rational degrees of credence and the justification of full belief, it looks like 
we're left with nothing but the bare claim that if things appear the same with respect to 
two prospective beliefs, they must agree in justificatory status. Why should we accept 
this? It's at just this point that the subjectivist should offer some additional arguments, 
arguments that show that there's some interesting role for appearances in determining 
what our evidence is or some interesting role for subjective states in the formulation of 
norms. My arguments for objectivism are designed to head off these responses.  Norms 
aren't just concerned with appearances and the appearances don't determine what 
evidence we have.   
 
2.1 The Transcendental Argument 
My first argument for objectivism is a transcendental argument.  The argument starts 
from the assumption that there are practical requirements to conform to objectivist 
norms. It proceeds to show that these norms are binding only if there are objectivist 
norms that govern belief.   
 Consider some plausible objectivist norms: 
You shouldn't sentence the innocent for crimes they 
didn't commit (Only the Guilty). 
You should sentence those you know to be guilty (Any 
Known Offender). 
You should repair your past (objective) wrongs (Repair).9 
I don't have any complicated arguments for Only the Guilty or Repair. They both 
strike me as compelling.10 Consider what happens if you punish Agnes for something 
that she didn't do and discover you've done this later. Bad things happen all the time, 
but this bad thing is something that you have a special obligation to do something 
about. You should assume responsibility for this harm and have a duty to make things 
right even though you might not have a similar duty to respond to all the harms that 
you happen to cause.11 This suggests there's a reparative duty, a duty to right something 
that you wrongfully brought about. The duty arises because of a morally significant 
relation between you and Agnes that doesn't hold between Agnes and other parties 
who weren't involved who could also take steps to make her better off.12 The fact that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 An objective wrong involves violating an objectivist norm, such as Only the Guilty. 
10 I should also add that if there were a group of people who acted as if these norms 
were binding, it would be hard to see what could be objectionable about it. We can 
imagine alternative practices where people acted as if only subjective correlates of 
these norms would be binding. This might not seem to be a terrible practice. It would, 
however, be a practice that, to my mind, left out some nice features of the practice that 
involved striving to conform to Repair. In short, it would be nice if morality 
incorporated norms like Only the Guilty, Any Known Offender, and Repair and it 
wouldn't be nicer if morality dropped these in favor of subjective correlates. If true, 
might this be some evidence that morality involves objective elements? Perhaps. See 
Enoch (2009), Preston-Roedder (2014), and Sayre-McCord (MS) for discussion. 
11 For an extended discussion on this point, see Littlejohn (2012). 
12 For further defense of this description of the case, see Littlejohn (2012). Zimmerman 
(2008) defends a kind of subjectivist view, one that insists that what we should do is 
always determined by a kind of expected value. He thinks (rightly, in my view) that 
you weren't aware of the morally significant relationship you'd create in punishing her 
doesn't erase your unique debt to her.13 
 We should resist the urge to rewrite these norms to fit the subjectivist 
framework. The subjectivist is right that we need to think about the subjective aspects 
of an agent's life when assessing the agent and her conduct. The subjective matters 
when we're interested in things like credit, blame, criticism, and the like, but this is 
only part of morality and it isn't more important than other aspects of morality. There 
is another part of morality that isn't directly concerned with such things and it's the 
part of morality that gives us guidelines that help to determine when someone has the 
right to proceed without interference, when someone should be protected against 
those who would harm them or their interests, and when some party need to take steps 
to apologize and make reparations. It's this part of morality that the objectivist gets 
right. Getting this right requires identifying standards that should guide action even 
when not seen perfectly by an agent. I fear that subjectivism, if left unchecked, leads us 
to draw mistaken conclusions about the kind of responsibility we should assume in the 
wake of violating some (putative) objectivist norm because it tries to deny the 
possibility that such guidelines have normative force when some agent has imperfect 
access to them.  
 The second assumption in the argument is unificationism, the view that says that 
there is a principled connection between the justificatory status of beliefs about what's 
required of us in the situations we're in and the justificatory status responses we 
believe to be required.  Unificationism says that if someone justifiably judges that they 
are required to Φ, she couldn't be required to do other than Φ.14 Segregationism denies 
this. The segregationist says that we can be required to do other than Φ in situations 
where we nevertheless justifiably judge that we're required to Φ. The disagreement is 
about a kind of detachment.  Everyone agrees that if someone believes that they 
should Φ, nothing follows about whether they should. The interesting question is 
about the case in which they believe they should Φ and this belief is justified. If this 
belief is sanctioned by the relevant norms, could it be wrong for the subject to Φ in 
light of it?  The unificationist thinks that it couldn't be wrong.15 The segregationist 
thinks that it can be.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
subjectivists have to deny Repair and deny Only the Guilty. We shall discuss this 
further in §3. 
13 The intuition that suggests that it's possible for conscientious agents to violate moral 
norms owing to factual ignorance or mistake is reasonably widespread, even among 
those who defend subjectivist theories.  See Enoch (2012), Herman (1993), and 
MacFarlane (2016) for interesting attempts to vindicate the intuitions that seem to 
support objectivist norms.   
14 The relevant requirements are those that have a special kind of rational authority 
such that we count as irrational or unreasonable if we give these requirements no 
weight. Requirements of the law or etiquette   
15 For defenses of unificationism, see Foley (2001), Gibbons (2010), Littlejohn (2012), and 
Way and Whiting (forthcoming). Greco (2014), Ichikawa and Jenkins (2013), 
Kiesewetter (forthcoming), Titelbaum (2015), and Smithies (2011) defend limited 
versions of unificationism that apply just in the epistemic realm.  For defenses of 
segregationism, see Coates (2012), Fantl and McGrath (2009), Feldman (2008), and 
Lasonen-Aarnio (MS). 
 We can use the Enkratic Requirement to defend unificationism:  
Enkratic Requirement: You ought to see to it that: if you 
judge that you yourself ought to Φ, you Φ. 
This is a wide-scope requirement. It rules out certain combinations. The unificationist 
accepts a conditional, not a wide-scope requirement.  Titelbaum (2015) shows us how 
to derive the conditional using the requirement. Suppose that you ought not Φ. Can 
you nevertheless justifiably judge that you yourself ought to Φ? No. We can rewrite the 
requirement like this: you ought to see to it either (you do not believe that you ought to 
Φ or you Φ). Assume that you ought not Φ.  We can now derive that you ought to see 
to it that you do not believe that you ought to Φ. Thus, if it's not the case that you ought 
not believe that you ought to Φ, it's not the case that you ought not Φ.  In the case 
where you justifiably judge that you ought to Φ, you couldn't be in a case where you 
ought not Φ.   
 We've established that you cannot justifiably believe falsehoods about what 
you're required to do. We can take two lessons from this. First, it shows that we should 
reject orthodox accounts of justification:  
Apparent Truth: If it seems to a subject that p and she has 
no available defeaters, her belief in p would be justified if 
based on this seeming.16 
Sufficient Strength: If a subject who doesn't believe p has 
sufficiently strong evidence for believing p, her belief in p 
would be justified if based on this evidence.17 
Mentalism: The justificatory status of a belief supervenes 
upon the subject's non-factive mental states and the 
subjective aspects of her mental events.18 
Reliabilism: If there is a sufficiently reliable process that 
produces the subject's belief in p, that belief is justified.19 
We can generate counterexamples to these views by focusing on propositions about 
what you yourself should do.20  Imagine pairs of subjects with the same evidence, with 
the same mental states, and the same reliable processes coming to believe that they're 
required to Φ. We should be able to stipulate that one subject is required not to Φ and 
that the other ought to Φ argue on unificationist grounds that these views deliver the 
wrong verdicts.21  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 This is an increasingly popular view. See, for example, Brogaard (2016), Huemer 
(2007), and Tucker (2010). 
17 See Conee and Feldman (2004). 
18 See Cohen (1984) and Conee and Feldman (2004). 
19 See Goldman (1986). 
20 Proponents of these views might say that their views are not subject to these 
counterexamples, but see the next section for a response to a line of response I think 
isn't very promising.  
21 It is worth noting that the argument for unificationism could go through even if we 
dropped our objectivist assumptions about practical norms. Even without these norms, 
we could cause trouble for these orthodox accounts of justification for it seems that 
each of these accounts should allow for the possibility of false but justified beliefs 
about what we ought to believe, feel, or do even if we assume that facts about these 
oughts supervene upon a subject's subjective mental life. Once we have established 
 Second, we can now offer an argument for Only Truth:  
A Transcendental Argument 
T1. There are objective practical norms that sometimes 
say that we should not Φ even when we're not aware that 
we should not Φ and not aware of the conditions that 
constitute the relevant norm's application conditions. 
T2. If there are such norms, there are situations where we 
should not judge that we are required to Φ even when 
we're not aware that we shouldn't Φ and are not aware of 
the conditions that constitute the relevant norm's 
application conditions.  
T3. The best explanation of this is that Only Truth 
governs belief.22  
TC. So, Only Truth governs belief.  
This is an abductive argument, so much rests on (T3).  While (T1) and (T2) only rule out 
the possibility of a kind of false, justified belief (i.e., one that is about what we're 
required to do), there doesn't seem to be anything special about such beliefs from the 
epistemic point of view. Only objectivist norms like Only Truth can explain why the 
justification of normative belief requires truth.   
   
2.2 Just Follow (Just) the Evidence 
In recent discussions of the nature of evidence and its theoretical roles, these 
principles enjoy widespread acceptance:  
Revise: If you have rational conditional beliefs and you 
acquire a new piece of evidence p then you ought to 
adjust your credence in q so that Pnewq = Pold(q|p).    	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
that there cannot be false, justified normative beliefs, it will then be difficult to resist 
an argument for Only Truth because we couldn't appeal to these (apparently) falsified 
accounts of justification to resist the arguments for Only Truth and (as we'll see below) 
because once we have the argument for the claim that normative beliefs have to be 
true to be justified we can then argue that the set of beliefs that would have to be true if 
justified includes non-normative beliefs.   
22 Strictly speaking, unificationism tells us only that a certain kind of belief cannot be 
both justified and false, not that it cannot be justified because it is false. There are 
unificationist views that are 'top-down' in that they say that the reason that the relevant 
belief cannot be both false and justified is that the conditions that ensure that they are 
justified can 'shift' the status of Φ-ing. We find versions of these views in Foley (2001) 
and Gibbons (2010). Way and Whiting (forthcoming) also express some sympathy for 
this view.  The proponents of the top-down view could challenge (T3) and say that the 
reason that normative judgments cannot be both justified and false is best explained 
by the fact that the justifying conditions can help to shift the status of Φ-ing. I think 
Only Truth provides a better explanation for two reasons. First, closure principles 
cause serious difficulties for top-down unificationist views. See Littlejohn (2012). 
Second, these top-down views give us implausible accounts of responsibility as they 
either lead to a widespread skepticism about responsibility or sever the connection 
between culpability and Arpaly's (2002) notion of de re unresponsiveness. See 
Littlejohn (2014).  
Remain: If you have rational conditional beliefs you 
should not update on p unless you acquire p as a new 
piece of evidence. 
In combination, Revise and Remain tell us we ought to revise our beliefs on the 
evidence and nothing but the evidence.   
 These principles can be used in an argument for objectivism about norms and 
justification. Suppose that you come to justifiably believe p. You see that q would be 
true if p. What attitude should you take towards q? If we accept closure principles for 
justification, it would be proper or acceptable for you to believe q. That suggests that if 
you justifiably believe p and infer q, you wouldn't have violated Remain. That suggests, 
in turn, that the object of your justified belief belongs to your evidence:  
Justified Evidence: If you justifiably believe p, your 
evidence includes p.23 
  Now let's think about the ontology of evidence. We're interested in 
propositionally specified evidence or reasons, the things that are (potentially) the 
subject's reasons for believing, feeling, or doing things.  The subject's reasons are the 
things that figure in her reasoning and stand in logical relations. Ascriptions that 
specify the agent's propositionally specified reasons entail corresponding propositional 
knowledge claims.24 If we say, 'Agnes' reason for φ-ing is that p', what we say is true 
only if, 'Agnes knows that p' is true. There appears to be considerable linguistic 
evidence for half of Williamson's equation: 
E=K: Your evidence includes p iff you know p.25    
 If we combine E=K and Justified Evidence we get our first argument for (O1) and (O2):  
An Evidentialist Argument for Objectivism 
E1. If you justifiably believe p, p is part of your evidence. 
E2. If p is part of your evidence, you know p.  
EC. If you justifiably believe p, you know p. 
A belief is justified only if it is knowledge. Thus, there is a norm that requires us to 
believe only what we know. 
 Subjectivists can either challenge Justified Evidence or argue that it cannot be 
used to support (OC). Dialectically, it doesn't make much sense for subjectivists to 
deny Justified Evidence. They wouldn't want to say that satisfying the norms that tell 
us when it's appropriate to update on some evidence requires more than justified belief. 
If they did, there would be pairs of subjects who justifiably believe p where only one 
can properly draw conclusions from this. The requirement for one subject to refrain 
from updating would have to be sufficiently obscure to the subject so that they didn't 
threaten the justificatory status of her beliefs but nevertheless sufficiently 'internal' to 
be binding. It's hard to see how this view could possibly be attractive to the subjectivist. 
Instead, we should expect the subjectivist to challenge the use of Justified Evidence in 
an argument for (OC). They'll do so by insisting that justification is a non-factive 
notion.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 For defenses of Justified Evidence, see Comesana (2016), Fantl and McGrath (2009), 
and Littlejohn (2012). 
24 See Hyman (1999), Unger (1975), and Williamson (2000). 
25 For defenses of E=K, see Williamson (2000). Hyman (1999) defends a similar view 
about potential motivating reasons. For criticism that doesn't focus on the truth-
requirement on reasons or evidence, see Hughes (2014) and Locke (2015). 
 Justified Evidence can be understood in different ways.  We can read into it 
some orthodox account of justification and then try to show that any belief that has the 
relevant justification-making properties can properly figure in reasoning and give us 
premises to draw conclusions from. 26  Alternatively, we could resist the idea a 
proposition gets turned into evidence by virtue of being the content of a belief that has 
the justification-making properties that figure in non-factive accounts of justified 
belief. We could say that justification turns on whether a belief's contribution to 
rational processes is a good one. We ask whether the belief's object is the kind of thing 
that could be a good tool or instrument. We thus use some independent standard that 
distinguishes genuine reasons from spurious reasons to ground a standard that we use 
to distinguish the good beliefs from the bad, the beliefs that can properly function in 
reasoning from the ones that cannot.  I prefer the second reading of Justified Evidence. 
Since I think we have good independent reason to think that a propositionally 
specified reason couldn't be a genuine reason unless it was a fact, I'd argue from the 
fact that genuine reasons are facts 'back' to the conclusion that justified beliefs are the 
ones that provide us with facts to figure in our reasoning.    
 How should we decide between these options? Should we combine Justified 
Evidence with some orthodox non-factive account of justification and reject E=K or 
should we combine Justified Evidence with E=K and accept (EC)?  One reason to prefer 
the second option to the first is that the first faces serious difficulties that don't arise for 
factive accounts of justification.  
 Let's say that the 'target view' is a view that incorporates Justified Evidence and 
allows for false evidence because it sees justification as a property that a belief has if it's 
produced by a reliable process or because it's the belief that results from the excellent 
use of a subject's rational capacities even when the resulting belief is mistaken.  
Difficulties arise for the target view when we think about the properties of processes 
like conditionalization and the properties of 'ought'. 
 Imagine that Agnes completes Here I Am, a carefully researched if somewhat 
self-indulgent autobiography. Because it is so carefully researched, Agnes has a well-
founded belief that corresponds to each claim in the body of the book.  Thus, it would 
seem that she should have a justified belief that corresponds to each claim in the body 
of the book. After completing the body, her fact-checker tells her that she found 
precisely one error in the manuscript. Alas, her fact-checker dies suddenly and 
unexpectedly before she can reveal the error's location. After searching in vain for the 
error, Agnes fails to find the error. She notes in the book's preface that the book 
contains an error and it is sent to press.   
 Agnes satisfies the conditions that orthodox accounts of justification impose so 
we should say that she has a justified belief that corresponds to each claim in the body 
of her book (i.e., p1-p1,000,000) and in the preface. Thus, the target view supports (P1)-(P3) 
in this argument:  
P1. Agnes justifiably believes p1, Agnes justifiably believes 
p2, ..., and Agnes rationally believes p1,000,000. 
P2. Agnes justifiably believes ~(p1 & p2 & ... & p1,000,000). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 See Fantl and McGrath (2009) and Comesana (2016) for examples of this. They think 
that arguments from error also give us good reason to allow that a subject's reason or 
evidence could be a false proposition. For responses to these arguments, see Alvarez 
(2010), Dutant (forthcoming), Hornsby (2007), Littlejohn (2012), and Lord (forthcoming). 
P3. Whatever Agnes justifiably believes belongs to her 
evidence. 
P4. Agnes ought to update on p1, Agnes ought to update 
on p2, ..., and Agnes ought to update on p1,000,000. [(P1), (P3), 
and Revise] 
P5. Agnes ought to update on ~(p1 & p2 & ... & p1,000,000). 
[(P2), (P3), and Revise] 
P6. Agnes ought to (update on p1 & update on p2 & ... & 
update on p1,000,000). [(P4), Agglomeration] 
P7. If Agnes ought to update on ~(p1 & p2 & ... & p1,000,000), 
Agnes ought not update on (p1 & p2 & ... & p1,000,000). 
P8. Agnes ought not update on (p1 & p2 & ... & p1,000,000). 
[(P5), (P7)]  
P9. If Agnes ought to: (update on p1, update on p2, ..., 
update on p1,000,000), it is not the case that Agnes ought not 
update on (p1 & p2 & ... & p1,000,000). 
P10. It is not the case that Agnes ought not update on (p1 & 
p2 & ... & p1,000,000). [(P6), (P9)] 
Because (P10) contradicts (P8), we have to reject some premise in the reasoning that 
supports (P8) and (P10). 
 If we accept the objectivist view of justification on which justified beliefs have 
to be pieces of knowledge, we block the reasoning at the outset. We know that (P1) and 
(P2) couldn't both be true. I don't see how a proponent of the target view could 
plausibly reject both claims.27 Justified Evidence is part of the target view, so its 
defenders cannot reject (P3). Revise generates the 'ought' claims that support (P6) 
because of agglomeration. As for (P7), this is the plausible claim that if you ought to 
update on p, you should not also update on its negation.  As for (P9), this is plausible 
given that a process like conditionalization is cumulative. The result of 
conditionalizing on the conjuncts is the same as the result of conditionalizing on the 
conjunctions. It is hard to see how there could be a requirement to update on p, say, a 
requirement to update on q, and also a requirement to refrain from updating on the 
conjunction when we know in advance that the result of the one-step update and two-
step update has to be the same.   
 The trouble with the target view is that it identifies a non-factive epistemic 
relation as sufficient for the possession of evidence. This means the target view allows 
for inconsistent evidence. It cannot be that such things are things we ought to update 
on. Theoretically, the best way to save agglomeration and accommodate norms like 
Revise is adopt a factive account of evidence. When we combine that with Justified 
Evidence, we get our argument for (EC). The reason that justified beliefs have to be 
true is not that they need some maximal independent support, but because only beliefs 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Some writers would argue that we shouldn't accept (P1) and (P2). Some would argue 
this because they think that there's some kind of defeater operative that prevents them 
from both being true (e.g., Ryan (1991)). For arguments that we shouldn't deny that it's 
possible for (P1) and (P2) to be true, see Easwaran and Fitelson (2015) and Worsnip 
(2015). Some would try to show that we don't have the right evidence or grounds for 
(P2) to be true (e.g., Smith (2016)).  Using testimony, it's hard to see how denying (P2) 
could be a viable strategy.    
that contribute truths to rational processes meet the standard that distinguishes the 
beliefs that can do what they're supposed to do from those that cannot.  
 
3. Subjectivism about Justification 
In the previous sections, I've offered a transcendental argument for Only Truth and an 
evidentialist argument for Only Knowledge. I've also argued that these norms support 
an account of justification on which you can only justifiably believe what you know.  
 Most epistemologists reject (OC), but it isn't always clear where they think this 
kind of argument goes wrong.  Huemer (forthcoming) suggests that the problem with 
this style of argument for (OC) is not that they assume that there are objectivist norms, 
but with the further assumption that these norms tell us something about justification.  
He agrees that there's a sense in which we 'ought' to conform to epistemic norms like 
Only Truth. He agrees we cannot justifiably believe what we 'ought' not believe. Still, 
he thinks, there's no good reason to think that justification is an objectivist notion.  
 To square this circle, Huemer claims that much of our normative language is 
ambiguous.  Terms like 'ought' and 'should' admit of objective and subjective readings 
(or 'external' and 'internal' readings, as he puts it), but some terms like 'justification' 
admit of only one subjective reading. The difficulty with this argument is that (O1) is 
true on the subjective reading only and (O2) is true on the objective reading only:    
An Argument for Objectivism 
O1. Your beliefs are justified iff you violate no epistemic 
norms in holding these beliefs. 
O2. You violate no epistemic norms in holding these 
beliefs iff these beliefs constitute knowledge.  
OC. Your beliefs are justified iff they constitute 
knowledge. 
 As he sees things, justification is a matter of conforming only to subjective norms. 
 When it comes to debates between the objectivist and subjectivist about norms, 
he thinks we should see that these debates aren't substantive:  
Now suppose someone asks, “Does what a person should do 
depend upon external facts of which that person may be 
unaware, or does it only depend upon information 
available from the subject’s own point of view?” This 
would be a misguided question. There is no deep issue 
there; there is only the perfectly shallow, semantic 
question of whether you want to use the internal sense or 
the external sense of the word “should”. Both senses, as 
far as I can tell, are established in ordinary English; 
neither is more correct than the other (Huemer: 
forthcoming: 7). 
Because these debates rest on the mistaken presupposition that there is a substantive 
debate to be had, they should end. The objectivist and subjectivist about norms should 
see that their opponent's views get something important right. Live and let live.   
 When it comes to debates about justification, however, he thinks these debates 
shouldn't continue because (O1) is true only on its subjective reading:  
The truth of this thesis [i.e., that justification is entirely a 
matter of conforming to subjective norms], by the way, 
strikes me as just an obvious semantic point. Unlike the 
word “should”, I think the word “justified” is not 
ambiguous; rather, it has only the internal meaning in 
standard English (Huemer forthcoming: 8).  
Even if the objectivist is right about epistemic norms, there is nothing that the 
objectivist about justification gets right.  When it comes to justification, it only matters 
whether we conform to subjectivist norms. Only the subjectivist about justification has 
a sensible view and that's why this debate should end. Live and let die.  
 In discussions of the subjective 'ought' and the (alleged) ambiguity of normative 
language, philosophers tend to be dividers or debaters.28 Dividers think that pointing to 
the ambiguity will show that there's no need to debate an issue because both parties to 
the debate are right about something. The parties to the debate are only mistaken in 
that they fail to see their opponent's insights. Maybe Huemer has his finger on 
something important here in helping us see why so many epistemologists would be 
open to Only Truth but convinced that justification couldn't require truth.  
 Is Huemer right that the debates between objectivists and subjectivists about 
norms aren't substantive? I think not. Objective and subjective norms can come into 
conflict. In some cases of conflict, it looks as if there's a difficult and substantive 
question about how we should deal with these conflicts. In turn, it's not at all obvious 
that the justified response would be to conform to subjective norms and violate 
objective ones.  The suggestion that the debates between the objectivist and 
subjectivist aren't substantive might be plausible if the subjectivist could vindicate the 
intuitions that drive objectivism, but we'll see that they cannot do this.  The upshot is 
that subjectivists should be debaters, not dividers.  
 Consider one disagreement that dividers take to be non-substantive, a debate 
between objectivists about punishment and subjectivists who accept norms such as 
this one:  
You should sentence the accused iff their guilt is beyond 
all reasonable doubt (Beyond Reasonable Doubt). 
According to Only the Guilty and All Known Offenders, Agnes would have done 
nothing wrong if, say, she sentenced 1,000,000 persons standing trial provided that she 
knew of the accused to be guilty. Assuming, as we will, that Agnes believed the accused 
to be guilty beyond any reasonable doubt if she knew them to be guilty, the 
subjectivists who accept Beyond Reasonable Doubt would agree that Agnes did no 
wrong by sentencing these 1,000,000 persons for the crimes they committed.  
 The interesting issues don't arise when everyone agrees that Agnes got it all 
right, but when it seems to someone that Agnes got something wrong.  Let's imagine 
again that Agnes serves on 1,000,000 juries and that the evidence in each case leaves 
no room for reasonable doubt. Thus, we get:  
1. Agnes subjectively ought to convict in case 1. 
2. Agnes subjectively ought to convict in case 2. 
3. Agnes subjectively ought to convict in case 3.   
... 
1,000,000. Agnes subjectively ought to convict in case 1,000,000. 
Suppose that after her 1,000,000th case is brought to a close Agnes learns that one of 
the people convicted was innocent. She thus learns:  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 See Sepielli (forthcoming). 
1,000,001. Agnes objectively ought not: (convict in case 1 & 
convict in case 2 & ... & convict in case 1,000,000).  
If Agnes knows that she objectively ought not do something, it seems plausible that she 
subjectively ought not do that thing:  
1,000,002. Agnes subjectively ought not: (convict in case 1 
& convict in case 2 & ... & convict in case 1,000,000). 
If the subjective 'ought' behaves like the 'ought' of standard deontic logic, 
agglomeration and (1)-(1,000,000) give us: 
1,000,003. Agnes subjectively ought to: (convict in case 1 & 
convict in case 2 & ... & convict in case 1,000,000).  
And if the subjective 'ought' acts anything like the 'ought' of standard deontic logic 
(1,000,002) gives us:  
1,000,004. It is not the case that Agnes subjectively ought 
to: (convict in case 1 & convict in case 2 & ... & convict in 
case 1,000,000).  
 Since (1,000,003) contradicts (1,000,004), something has to give. It seems we 
have four options:  
Option 1: Deny at least one of (1)-(1,000,000) and deny 
Beyond Reasonable Doubt. 
Option 2: Deny (1,000,001) and deny Only the Guilty.  
Option 3: Deny that the subjective 'ought' behaves like the 
'ought' of standard deontic logic.  
Option 4: Deny the bridge principle that states that you 
subjectively should not do what you know you objectively 
should not do. 
Dividers want to show that the disagreement between the subjectivists and objectivists 
isn't substantive, so they cannot avoid the contradiction by means of Option 1 or 2. If 
they deny Only the Guilty or Reasonable Doubt, they would enter into just the debate 
that they wish we'd all stay out of.  
 The third option is problematic for dividers.  Suppose we've established (1)-
(1,000,000) and (1,000,002) and look to avoid the contradiction by denying 
agglomeration. It seems that, barring cases of duress, a subject who fails to do what she 
subjectively ought to could be held responsible for that failure or subject to criticism. 
We shouldn't blame or criticize someone for carrying out all of the acts described in (1)-
(1,000,000) if we'd blame or criticize them for failing to carry them all out. (Does it 
make sense to say that someone would avoid criticism iff they sentenced in each case 
but would not avoid criticism if they sentenced everyone?) 
 The fourth option is the one that remains. It looks as if dividers have good 
grounds for challenging the bridge principle.29  Consider the mineshaft case.30 Ten 
miners are working together underground, but Agnes doesn't know whether they are 
in Shaft A or Shaft B. She knows that it's raining and that if she does nothing all will 
die at the bottom of the mine. She has three options: block shaft A, block shaft B, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 See Wedgwood (2013) for discussion. Wedgwood offers a revision of the Enkratic 
Requirement that is supposed to avoid the difficulties that arise for this bridge 
principle. The principle holds only when Φ is a fine-grained option. In our case, it is 
not. 
30 Discussed in Parfit (2011). The case is a variant on Regan (1980) and Jackson (1991).  
partially block both shafts.  If she completely blocks the opening to A, there will be 
enough air inside for 10 to live but B will flood and kill anyone in that shaft. If she 
blocks B completely, there will be enough air inside for 10 to live, but A will flood and 
kill anyone in that shaft. If she partially blocks both openings, she will be guaranteed 
to save 9 miners wherever they happen to be but 1 will be killed. In this sort of case, 
Agnes knows that she objectively ought to either block Shaft A or B, but doesn't know 
which shaft it is. Thus, she knows that she objectively ought not partially close the 
shafts. Still, it seems to many commentators that Agnes subjectively ought to partially 
close the shafts. This suggests that the bridge principle is mistaken. 
 Wedgwood notes (rightly) that the Enkratic Requirement but only when it's 
read as pertaining to fine-grained options (e.g., blocking shaft A completely). Thus, it's 
plausible that the bridge principle is only superficially similar to the Enkratic 
Requirement and shouldn't be accepted.  If dividers reject the bridge principle, would 
this solve the problem? No, not quite. If they deny the bridge principle, they can reject 
(1,000,002). They could say that while there is a sense in which Agnes succeeded in 
doing everything she should do, there is another sense in which she failed to do what 
she should do. Suppose we say that. If Agnes then asks if she's required to make 
reparations, what would the divider say? 
 The divider has to ask the subjectivists what to say since they want to avoid 
disagreements with them. Subjectivists might adopt one of two views. They might offer 
a version of Repair, suitably modified to fit with their theoretical orientation. They 
might say that upon discovering that she sentenced an innocent person to prison, 
Agnes has a reparative duty to right some past wrong. On this view, it turns out to be 
true, as the objectivist says, that Agnes failed to do what she ought to do, but crucially 
the truth of this depends upon what was revealed after conviction. Alternatively, the 
subjectivist could insist that since Agnes did no wrong, violated no norm, she never 
failed to do what she ought to do and reparation isn't called for.  The subjectivist would 
say that the objective facts that figure in objectivist accounts of norm have to be 
excluded from the framework so that they don't figure in our account of rights, 
obligations, or duties to repair or make reparation.31 The accused would have the right 
to a fair trial, but not to escape sentencing if innocent or to receive reparations if 
wrongly convicted.   
 The problem with the first response is that it leads us right back to the problem 
we were trying to avoid by denying the bridge principle. If the subjectivist says that 
Agnes has a reparative duty because she failed to do something she ought to do by 
virtue of sentencing the accused in each case, the subjectivist is offering us an account 
on which (1,000,004) comes out as true. As we're assuming that the subjectivist wants 
to offer an account of 'ought' on which 'ought' satisfies agglomeration, this proposal 
won't do.  The truth of (1,000,004) would force us to give up at least one of (1)-
(1,000,000) but the subjectivist has no good grounds for giving up any of these claims. 
The new information doesn't change the fact that Agnes had adequate evidence at the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 The most completely worked out version of this view is found in Zimmerman (2008). 
He is a subjectivist in the sense that he thinks that what a subject ought to do depends 
upon her evidence and not upon any further facts that don't supervene upon that 
evidence. He is not a divider. For further defenses of the subjectivist debater, see 
Kiesewetter (forthcoming) and Lord (forthcoming b).  
time of sentencing and doesn't change the fact that she still has adequate evidence for 
believing of each conviction that it was appropriate.  
 The second subjectivist response causes trouble for dividers. If the subjectivist 
offers this response, she's now engaged in a genuine, substantive disagreement with 
the objectivist. The divider cannot say that there's a kernel of truth in both views 
because our subjectivist is rejecting the idea that there's some sense in which we ought 
to make reparations.  Even if Agnes learned the identity of the individual who was 
framed, our subjectivist would insist that the objectivists would be wrong to say that 
Agnes did something that violated this person's rights, that she failed in her obligations 
to the accused, and wrong to say that Agnes has a reparative duty to right some past 
wrong. At just this point there is a substantive question that we need to settle.  Upon 
discovering the identity of the innocent person she convicted, would Agnes' decision 
not to make reparations be justified? If you say that it would, you are taking up a 
substantive view and siding with a subjectivist debater. If you say that it would not, you 
are taking up a substantive view and siding with an objectivist debater who takes 
justification to depend upon conforming to objectivist norms.  
 It seems clear to me that Agnes would have no justification for failing to try to 
make reparations, but this interesting fact about justification would appear to be 
connected to the past violation of an objectivist norm (Only the Guilty), not a 
subjectivist norm.  Thus, the debate turns out to be substantive and the objectivist view 
about justification turns out to have an important virtue that the subjectivist view 
lacks. The objectivist (and the objectivist alone?) has a coherent position that 
vindicates important intuitions about reparation.                     
 
4. Conclusion 
I have defended two objectivist views, one about norms and another about 
justification. There is no simple case to be made for either objectivist view, but it seems 
that the objectivist framework best fits with some plausible claims about the kinds of 
obligations we're under and with some popular claims about the normative 
significance of our evidence. What emerges from this is a simple idea that will 
undoubtedly require further defense. For belief to play its role well, it has to provide us 
with reasons and put us in touch with the part of reality that consists of facts. A belief 
only does this when it constitutes knowledge. This is why Only Knowledge governs 
belief. There is little theoretical gain to be had by insisting that this point, if correct, 
tells us nothing about justification. Justification loses all of its theoretical significance if 
we characterize it as a status that a belief can have or fail to have quite apart from 
whether that belief conforms to all the norms that govern belief. This is why 
objectivism about norms and justification stands or falls together. 
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